It's Always The Worst-Case Scenario

Another Iraq war "expert" presented in the Times, Kenneth Pollack, argues,

If we leave behind a raging civil war in which the Iraqi people are incomprehensibly worse off than they had been under Saddam Hussein and the Middle East more threatened by the chaos spilling over from Iraq than they ever were by the dictator’s arms, then no one will care how well-intentioned our motives.

If all that matters is the outcome, Mr. Pollack, then our pure-as-snow motives going in are no more relevant than would be our "well-intentioned motives" when pulling out. It's a false dichotomy anyway - unless Mr. Pollack sees the present situation as "a raging civil war in which the Iraqi people are incomprehensibly worse off than they had been under Saddam Hussein", as we don't need a force the size of the present occupation force to keep a significantly larger civil war from breaking out. As an "expert," you would think he would recall from the long period of sanctions how effective a "no fly zone" and total air dominance can be at preventing troop movements.

Let's look at Iraq's neighbors.... If a post-occupation insurgency were actually a threat to them (and possibly even if not), Turkey, Syria, and Iran could be anticipated to create "security zones" inside Iraq to limit its effect. This, of course, would be contrary to U.S. goals for the region, but none of those countries are going to permit an Iraqi civil war to spill across its borders. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait? They'll be fully backed by the U.S. military. That leaves Jordan and, even if we assume that Jordan is incapable of defending its border, even if we ignore its history and pretend that it cannot put down civil unrest, and even if we assume that the U.S. completely withdrew from Iraq (yes, there will be continued troops and continued air dominance for many years after "withdrawal), on the opposite side of Jordan is a nation called "Israel" that does not sit idly by when its neighbors fall into civil war and chaos.

Why can't proponents of indefinite occupation be honest? They don't fear a civil war leading to chaos. They fear the end of Iraq as a nation state, with neighboring companies carving it up into pieces in the name of "security". (Perhaps I'm giving them too much credit, though, as some so-called "experts" don't seem particularly bright or informed.)

The "Experts" Speak (Again)

More than four years ago, The Guardian asked a number of "experts" on Iraq to comment on how to improve the situation. The suggestions were pretty mediocre. The most laughable? From Danielle Pletka:

For Danielle Pletka, of the neo-conservative American Enterprise Institute, improved security was a matter of being tougher. The US should "stop acting as a weak power, because that is what is giving encouragement to the terrorists", she urged.

"We could stop driving around in Humvees without actually arresting anybody," she said. "We could arrest a lot of people, including all of the Ba'athists, the mukhabarat [secret police] and senior military who are floating around freely in Iraq. We could stop releasing people after we arrest them, often within 24 hours."

Closing Iraq's borders effectively, to prevent infiltration from neighbouring countries, she added, was half the battle. "We could make clear to the governments that are allowing infiltrators through that the consequences to them will be extraordinarily unpleasant if it continues."

Her suggestion for how to get us onto a path of success? One of those "It would be funny, but..." things.

What would kickstart moves to peace?

Danielle Pletka:

'Establish an understanding that there are liberal, democratic Iraqis who should be empowered with more control over the political and security wellbeing of the country'

• Chance of stability in 12 months: 50-75% as long as changes are made in tactics

The New York Times continues to anoint her as an expert:

But what about the mistaken assumptions that remain unexamined? Looking back, I felt secure in the knowledge that all who yearn for freedom, once free, would use it well. I was wrong. There is no freedom gene, no inner guide that understands the virtues of civil society, of secret ballots, of political parties. And it turns out that living under Saddam Hussein’s tyranny for decades conditioned Iraqis to accept unearned leadership, to embrace sect and tribe over ideas, and to tolerate unbridled corruption.

So when we invaded, her position was, "Wave a magic wand, get freedom." Now she knows better, because with her newfound grasp of Iraqi history she has come to realize that Saddam Hussein created tribalism and sectarianism in the Middle East, and apparently that he succeeded a government that was honest, diligent, free of corruption, and democratically elected. Having been 100% wrong on the invasion, and taking the ignorant and wildly incorrect position that the U.S. wasn't arresting or detaining suspected insurgents and terrorists in 2003, Pletka continues to display near-total ignorance of the region and its history.

Some have used Iraq’s political immaturity as further proof the war was wrong, as if somehow those less politically evolved don’t merit freedoms they are ill equipped to make use of. We would be better served to understand how the free world can foster appreciation of the building blocks of civil society in order to help other victims of tyranny when it is their turn.

The "some have used" game. Yes, particularly war supporters who try to explain away their failures with Coulteresque racism directed at Arabs and Muslims.

But those voices who can tell us how nation building works, and the difficulties of occupation? Had Ms. Pletka been listening, she would have heard those voices before the invasion. Instead she plugged her ears and dreamed up a "democracy gene". And when things went wrong, advanced the line that we had a pretty good chance of success if only we would get tougher and arrest more people, and turn power over to "liberal, democratic Iraqis"... which, yes, in her mind meant Ahmed Chalabi.

Some expert. And yet, on it goes.

Bush Speechwriters United....

... Against Obama.

Michael Gerson attempts to attack Barack Obama's record on the Iraq war, but first a blatantly false assertion about McCain:

John McCain's nomination was ensured by the success of the surge he had consistently advocated, against intense opposition.

Daniel Larison responds:

This is ludicrous. McCain was the frontrunner in the spring of 2007, long before anyone could have reasonably claimed that the “surge” had done anything (not that many pundits didn’t make outlandish claims), and there was in any case never any doubt in the Republican rank-and-file that the “surge” was the right thing to do. On the contrary, if McCain’s nomination was ever assured it was assured by the collapse of his only real national rival, Mitt Romney, under the waves of the Huckaboom, whose beginning had literally nothing to do with the war in Iraq.

Gerson attempts to depict Obama as inconsistent on Iraq, lifting his analysis out of an essay by fellow Bush Speechwriter Peter Wehner. The phases appear to be:

1. The 2002 speech, opposing the Iraq war;
2. A post-war period, from 2003 to 2006, in which he argued that it would be irresponsible to withdraw, and that we had an obligation to try to stabilize Iraq;
3. Starting in late 2006, argument for phased withdrawal, and skepticism about "the surge";
4. An apparent present mindset that his Iraq policy as President will be shaped by the facts on the ground.

Gerson, of course, is all for the idea that Obama should base his opinions on the realities of the situation in Iraq, not campaign promises. But this obviously undercuts his suggestion of inconsistency between pre-war opposition to invasion, and post-war support for an effort to make the invasion and occupation work. Did Gerson somehow miss that the facts on the ground changed considerably between the time Obama opposed a theoretical war, and the time he was hoping to get the best outcome out of an actual war? Of course not. Gerson's attacks on Obama are consistently short on honesty.

Not only is there no inconsistency between points one and two, Obama remains correct to have opposed the war, and once Bush started the war he was correct to press for the best outcome. Had his position during the post-war period been a demand for immediate withdrawal at any cost, it would have been ridiculous. And this, of course, further highlights Gerson's mendacity - Gerson would be savaging that stance, as well. (The difference being, had Obama taken such a ridiculous position, Gerson could have presented an honest impeachment.)

So now the "inconsistency" is reduced to skepticism of "the surge", and the suggestion that the time has come for the Iraqi government to shoulder the burden of running the country. Or, if you believe that the Iraqi government will remain incapable of assuming actual governance and responsibility for security in the next twelve to thirty months, that the time has come for us to cut our losses. With all due respect to Gerson, if he truly believed that "the surge" was working he wouldn't be trying to disown the Bush Administration's benchmarks of its success, or exaggerating its successes.

It is a perfectly legitimate reaction to the present situation to observe that it is not apparent that Iraqi factions will even try to resolve their differences as long as the occupation remains in force, and to ask, "Why shouldn't we cut our losses?" The easy thing to do is what Gerson and his ilk have done from day one - prop up the official Bush Administration line that up is down, left is right, and the best way to overcome past failures is to keep on doing exactly the same thing.

Oh, you say, but "the surge" was something different. Even accepting that argument, that the failures of the prior years of strategy had become so patent that there were some real changes in our approach to the occupation on the ground, the surge has failed by the Bush Administration's benchmarks, and apparently also in the assessment of General Petaeus. And here's where the circle closes - the brilliant strategy of the man Gerson wants to push into the White House? "We'll keep doing exactly the same thing, whether for a hundred years or even a thousand years." That, Gerson would have us believe, is the better Iraq war policy.

I know I tease Gerson here, by suggesting that he is a world-class idiot, but there's another possibility. He's capitalizing on his position with the Washington Post to inject Republican smears into mainstream discourse. If they don't stick, those feeding him the lines he is to pitch can shrug and say, "It's only Gerson." And if the smears stick, more credible right-wingers can run with them.

"Why They Hate Us"

It's a throwaway line in a rather silly editorial, but hasn't this one worn itself out?

The United States went into Iraq because, even if mistakenly, it wanted to rid the world of a menace. For this, the world hated it.

I would challenge Sebastian Mallaby to find me somebody who hates the United States because it toppled Saddam Hussein, except there is a possibility that if he looks hard enough he'll find... one.

Is Mallaby trying to get invited to a White House dinner?

Popularity

His editorial deserves greater ridicule, but I don't have time to keep up with all of Gerson's nonsense. Let's focus on this:

The real lesson in the years since Sept. 11 is different from what the Democratic candidates imagine: It is easy to be loved when you are a victim. It is harder to be popular when you act decisively to protect yourself and others.

Well, first of all we have a false dichotomy - our choices are either to "be a victim" or to "act decisively to protect yourself and others". Obviously, between the two, people are going to choose the flattering depiction - "Of course we want to be decisive! Of course we want to defend ourselves! Of course we defend others as well." Never mind that Gerson's "lesson" is not even close to reflecting reality. If Gerson were writing about the two World Wars and adhered to this style, he would elide the gratitude received by the nations the U.S. helped liberate, and would write something along the lines of, "Twice now, we have fought to free Europe, and both times Germany hated us for it."

If anybody has been playing the "victim" card since 9/11, it would be the Bush Administration. Being a "victim" is its excuse for everything, from secret detentions, to torture, to limiting habeas corpus, to warrantless spying, to entering into a massive war of choice despite the doubts and, in some cases, opposition of our allies. And the rift with the world did not start with a war in the defense of ourselves or others - it came by virtue of Bush's war of choice with Iraq. His decision that he was going to reinvent the region by war, whatever the doubts of our allies. What happened? He proved to be wrong in his professed rationale for the invasion and, despite an extremely competent invasion by the U.S. military, he proved to be beyond incompetent in the aftermath of the invasion.

Had Bush listened to "old Europe", he may well have learned within months that there were no "WMD's" in Iraq. But then, that was a pretext - he didn't want confirmation that Iraq had abandoned its weapons programs before the war, as it might have cost him the opportunity to start the war. Had he listened to "old Europe", or even to experienced voices within his own Administration, the military, or the State Department, he would have heard that successful occupation is difficult, requires a massive troop commitment, and that democratizing a nation and introducing market principles into a controlled economy is a touch more complicated than, say, growing a Chia Pet. Instead he sent in a band of incompetents like L. Paul Bremer to reinvent the nation, whatever the will of the people. And he decided to disband the Iraqi military, sending hundreds of thousands of armed, unemployed young men off to joblessness (i.e., to engage in street crime, join the "insurgency", or both.) What's not to love?

You can argue that once he got past his "The Pet Goat" moment, Bush started to act "decisively", sure. But decisive or not, you don't earn anybody's respect when every major decision you make is wrong. (I know that some people will choose to give him respect despite his incompetence, but let's not pretend that he earned it.) A half-competent President could have used his post-9/11 popularity boost, combined with the enormous "benefit of the doubt" initially afforded by the rest of the world, and could have embarked on a plan to eliminate Al Qaeda and to press for reforms in the Middle East. Bush had other plans.

Gerson follows his standard mendacious line that when the Democrats speak of improving our reputation in the world, it can only mean that we want to make this nation's enemies like us more. He is contemptuous of "old Europe" - "pacifists" (like the French in Chad?) who fought alongside us in the First Gulf War and Afghanistan.... er., I mean, who thought invading Iraq was a really bad idea. Gerson illustrates this idea by arguing that even when we're popular in other countries, they still may oppose our policies and pursue their own self-interest... well, duh. And even more idiotic, his notion that improving our international reputation will inevitably mean rolling over and giving our enemies everything they want. While this type of idiocy may be mistaken for brilliance during Bush Administration speechwriting sessions, it's unfortunate that Gerson's White House experience has apparently left him unable to write anything more than bad fiction.

Shifting Into Full "Get McCain Elected Mode" On The Iraq War

You never actually have to read past the headline to know what Charles Krauthammer is thinking, so today you read Democrats Dug In For Retreat and... nothing more needs to be said. (But that never seems to stop him.)

The column reflects Krauthammer's trademark mendacity, but probably highlights how McCain's supporters are going to try to depict the war in Iraq during the coming months. Never mind that it's another nine months before we will vote for the next President - plenty of time to see political progress based upon "the surge". Never mind that if there is real political progress within a year, the next President (of whatever party) will seek to build on that progress. No, under the Krauthammer model you rewrite history such that every missed benchmark for Iraq as set forth by Bush somehow becomes an artificial hurdle imposed by the Democrats. How absurd those Democrats are:

Democrats demand nothing less than federal-level reconciliation, and it has to be expressed in actual legislation.

To state the obvious, Democrats would see tremendous progress and cause for hope, even in the absence of federal level action, if there were an effective cessation of the armed conflict. Krauthammer, of course, promises no such thing - he is prepared to declare victory in the face of both the continuation of armed conflict and the failure of any progress in the formation of a national government. No benchmarks, no deadlines. Expecting measurable progress that suggests we could eventually reduce our troop forces or even withdraw? That's defeatist.

As the major newspapers love to remind us, they don't fact-check or edit editorials, so there's no check on Krauthammer-style mendacity. We don't have to look back very far to find the origins of the idea that progress in Iraq is marked by national reconciliation. The White House.

Today, President Bush gave an update to soldiers at Fort Jackson, S.C., on his September "Return on Success" speech and discussed some of the results of America's new strategy to win the fight in Iraq. Our new strategy in Iraq, including a surge in U.S. forces, has been fully operational for four months. This new strategy emphasizes securing the Iraqi population as the foundation for all other progress in the country; recognizes that once Iraqis feel safe they can begin to create jobs and opportunities; and builds on the idea that improvements in security will help the Iraqis achieve national reconciliation.

Which pretty much resolves the question of whether Krauthammer is ever going to let facts stand in the way of his opinions. As for this ridiculous expectation, foisted on us by our, um, Democratic President, Krauthammer continues,

The objection was not only highly legalistic but also politically convenient: Very few (including me) thought this would be possible under the Maliki government. Then last week, indeed on the day Cordesman published his report, it happened. Mirabile dictu, the Iraqi parliament approved three very significant pieces of legislation.

It was highly politically convenient to the Bush White House, because nobody thought that it could happen? Fascinating.

First, a provincial powers law that turns Iraq into arguably the most federal state in the entire Arab world. ... Second, parliament passed a partial amnesty for prisoners, 80 percent of whom are Sunni. Finally, it approved a $48 billion national budget that allocates government revenue - about 85 percent of which is from oil - to the provinces. Kurdistan, for example, gets one-sixth.

I think Krauthammer is being intentionally deceptive when he speaks of a single budget while ignoring total legislative gridlock over the division of oil revenues.

A law that could shape Iraq's future by clearing the way for investment in its oil fields is deadlocked by a battle for control of the reserves and no end to the impasse is in sight, lawmakers and officials say.

Also, the budget is not expected to improve the plight of individual Iraqis.

Okay... so what about the amnesty? An amnesty law will be progress, but once again we're discussing a law not yet approved or in effect (although it looks promising) and where it is not even clear how many people will benefit.

The measure would provide limited amnesty to detainees in Iraqi custody, although the precise number of people it would affect is not known. To become law, it must be signed by the other two members of the three-member presidency council: President Jalal Talabani and Vice President Adel Abdul-Mahdi, a Shiite.

"The vice president has no objections to the amnesty law, which will serve a big segment of detainees and convicted persons," a statement from his office said.

The measure excludes those held in U.S. custody and those imprisoned for a variety of crimes under Iraqi law, including terrorism, kidnapping, rape, antiquities smuggling, adultery and homosexuality.

It also excludes senior figures of the former Baath regime.

An amnesty law has been a key demand from the largest Sunni Arab bloc in parliament, and is widely seen as a significant step toward national reconciliation.

"Approving this law will be a big achievement for all Iraqi people and also for the Iraqi Accordance Front, because of all its efforts to get it passed in the parliament," said Sunni lawmaker Asmaa al-Dulaimi.

"But the most important thing is how this law will be implemented," which needs to be reliable and consistent, al-Dulaimi told The Associated Press in a telephone interview.

So yes, if the law passes and if the Sunnis find its implementation sufficient, that's a positive step. I am wary - it was only a few weeks ago that the new legislation supposedly reversing de-Baathification was being ballyhooed as a clear sign of progress, yet now even Krauthammer has dropped it from his list.

Finally, we have a provincial powers law, calling for provincial elections to be held no later than October 1. If the Iraqis pull this off, as I previously suggested, we will have a clear indication of whether this constitutes progress in advance of our own November elections. (But perhaps this time we will avoid hubris over "purple fingers of freedom".) I've been a strong advocate of trying to create a toehold for democracy at the local level, not that anybody has cared to listen to my opinion, so in my book this type of action is coming about four-and-a-half years behind schedule.

But you can see why the idea has Krauthammer retreating, full speed, from the idea of national reconciliation.

It will allow, for example, the pro-American Anbar sheiks to become the legitimate rulers of their province, exercise regional autonomy and forge official relations with the Shiite-dominated central government.

That is, it could create the context for eventual national reconciliation through federal elections, or it could lead to a fractious nation (or nations) comprised of assorted sheikhdoms with private armies - a recipe for long-term instability. While Krauthammer is willing to define as success the idea of an Iraq that is "arguably the most federal state in the entire Arab world", that's pretty much the opposite of what the Bush Administration has advocated for the past five years. Perhaps Krauthammer should pick up the phone and ask one of his White House contacts why they don't share his glee over the failure of their policies.

Despite all the progress, military and political, the Democrats remain unwavering in their commitment to withdrawal on an artificial timetable that inherently jeopardizes our "very real chance that Iraq will emerge as a secure and stable state."

Hm... What "artificial timetable" would that be? One that apparently exists only within the confines of Krauthammer's imagination.

What alternate timetable does Krauthammer endorse? As I indicated, this is his pro-McCain pitch, and there's not one word challenging McCain's notion that, progress or not, we should be prepared to keep doing the same thing for the next century or more.

Imagine the transformative effects in the region, and indeed in the entire Muslim world, of achieving a secure and stable Iraq, friendly to the United States and victorious over al-Qaeda. Are the Democrats so intent on denying George Bush retroactive vindication for a war they insist is his that they would deny their own country a now-achievable victory?

Bush has a year to prove his strategy in Iraq before the next President either takes over to build on his successes - successes that Krauthammer concedes we have to "imagine" - or tries to mitigate the damage from his many, many failures. If Bush ends up, as I expect, with a legacy of failure and incompetence, he will have nobody to blame but himself.

Political Divisions

Taking on David Brooks' idiocy in a somewhat more comprehensive manner.... When I saw the headline for his piece, and the blurb in the New York Times RSS feed, I thought, "He's stating the obvious." You can't win a national election without pulling together people with divergent interests, and you can't make major policy changes without causing some of them to become unhappy with you. Such an article would have been stating the obvious, but for the most part that's all Brooks does.

Instead, he claims that even though the Democratic candidates are running on a platform that puts health care reform front and center, and Iraq war policy close behind, that the people who vote them into office will suddenly become aghast at any effort to translate those campaign promises into policy. Note to David: Those people are going to vote for McCain.

Brooks first imagines that the Arab world will oppose our withdrawal from Iraq (as if we would withdraw to the point that we could not continue to guarantee the flow of oil), that the military will oppose withdrawal (loss of military progress, even in the face of zero political progress), and he imagines that this withdrawal would occur on the eve of elections (yeah, right) and thus that Americans would scream about our not giving the elections a chance. (Because the last elections, and the associated propaganda about "purple fingers of freedom" proved so successful in turning things around, right?) He also imagines that the fringe group who wants to "bring all the troops home now" will have the ear of Congress or the President. They won't.

I think it is pretty clear at this point that we will not see political progress in Iraq as long as we maintain the status quo. The Shiites have no incentive to share power with the Sunnis - they are the majority, and are happy to wait us out and make Iraq their country. The Sunnis have no incentive to compromise with the Shiites - the compromises offered tend to worsen their position, anyway, and they don't expect a long-term benefit from any current deal. The Kurds are pretty much doing their own thing - does anybody actually expect them to join in any sort of Iraqi state that would be able to impose its will upon them, as opposed to a loose confederation? The Iraqis don't share all of our goals for the country, and even when they do they aren't necessarily capable of implementing them. Prolonging the occupation won't change that.

Brooks is one of the champions of endless war. He'll be one of those bringing out a "parade of horribles" about what withdrawal will mean. He'll be among those smearing the proponents of any effort to end the war. But he as no ideas - zero, zilch, nada - about ending the conflict. The answer from his brand of useful idiot is always the same, "Even if our track record is one of total political failure, we should just keep doing what we're doing."

You know what? Brooks has a full year to demonstrate that "doing the same thing, over and over again" will finally produce different results. If it does not, I fully expect that the 61% or so of the population that supports withdrawal will grow. If he truly wishes endless war, he had better start thinking of something more persuasive than, "If we keep doing the same thing, eventually things might improve."

This also ties into his second argument - that despite eight years of total fiscal irresponsibility under G.W., it falls upon the Democrats to once again play the part of the fiscal grown-ups, balance the budget, and pay down the debts of an irresponsible Republican administration. Say what you want about Congress passing the budget, the fact is our present fiscal situation is the direct result of Congress's implementing GW's spending (and tax cut) priorities. Brooks whines that health care reform will be expensive. Yes, but here's one for him - it can be sold as a trade, with the $200 billion per year we're wasting in Iraq being shifted over to a policy that actually benefits Americans. (Sorry if you don't like the term "waste" - but for the period of time after Hussein's regime was toppled, unless and until we achieve political progress we're pouring good money after bad.) During the transition out of Iraq, they can borrow from GW's "Brooks-endorsed playbook" - "We're at war, so we get to run up deficits, and not to worry - the budget will (miraculously) balance in five years," coupled with optimistic budget projections.

... Because Criticizing The President Is So Good For Your Military Career

David Brooks babbles about a response to any troop reduction plan for Iraq,

There would be irate opposition from important sections of the military, who would feel that the U.S. was squandering the gains of the previous year. A Democratic president with few military credentials would confront outraged and highly photogenic colonels screaming betrayal.

Highly photogenic retired colonels? Because as anybody with a brain in his head knows, a colonel on active duty who screams "betrayal" at the Commander In Chief will be committing career suicide, and probably won't be holding that rank for very long.

The media seems to prefer photogenic retired generals, a lot of whom are arguing for phased withdrawal. (But when has Brooks, a cheerleader for the war, ever let such trivialities as facts interfere with his opinions.)

Is This The Beginning Of A New Beginning For McCain?

Today, Michael Gerson lavishes attention on John McCain, and repeats his standard prevarication about "the surge", followed by a "there are two types of people" generalization that would probably even make David Brooks blush.

President Bush's announcement of the surge in January 2007 pleased almost no one - neither Democrats who embraced retreat at any cost, nor Republicans who suspected the shift in approach was too little, too late.

Is Gerson truly a simpleton, or does he merely play one on the editorial pages? Seriously - people complain about The Times hiring Kristol, who is unquestionably a hack, but at least he has a brain in his head.

Gerson tries to reinvent McCain's revival as being about this new "success" in the Iraq war:

Yet the Republican candidate most closely identified with the war and the surge performs well in head-to-head polls against the Democrats. The revival of McCain's campaign was possible for one reason: the revival of American fortunes in Iraq.

Which explains why Republican voters put the Iraq war first... second... er, make that a close third (19%) on their list of priorities. Behind the economy (39%), something McCain admits that he doesn't understand, and immigration (23%).... Gerson may have sympathies with McCain's views on immigration, but (as obtuse as he often seems to be) he knows better than to make immigration policy the centerpiece of a column on the revival of McCain's candidacy.

Most categories of violence in Iraq are now down by more than 60 percent, and sectarian attacks in Baghdad have fallen by 90 percent. Sunni tribal leaders are conducting the first large-scale revolt of Arabs against al-Qaeda thuggery - which includes, we learned last week, strapping explosives to a mentally disabled woman and setting off a blast in a market.

McCain seems well suited to deal with this kind of evil - precisely because he would diagnose it as evil.

Whereas the other candidates would diagnose it as... oh, what's the word I'm struggling to find... evil?

In case it is necessary to restate my position, the military achievements in Iraq have been impressive. From the total domination of the country in the early days of the war, through the surge and its military goals of suppressing violence to make room for political progress. On the other hand, the Iraq war has been a political disaster, from the Bush Administration machinations that got us into the war, to the incompetent decisions made following the occupation (including extreme de-Baathification and the dissolution of the Iraq military, which laid the foundation for two of the most intractable problems, bringing Baathists into a unification government and a large, widespread insurgency.) Lest we forget, although the occupation was not the "cakewalk" we were promised, there was a two-year downward spiral following the invasion. Two years of squandered opportunity, due primarily to the Bush Administration's refusal to face reality and lust to unilaterally impose its own goals on the state of Iraq. Where was Gerson during that period abject incompetence? Oh, yeah....

In the general election, his ideological heresies will suddenly transform into strengths. Because of his immigration views, he is the only Republican candidate who can make a serious appeal to Hispanic voters. His positions on global warming and campaign finance reform will ease his outreach to independents.

If Gerson were paying attention to the voices of voters instead of the voices in his head, he would realize that McCain's present success arises from his "outreach to independents". The closer to the center you are, the more likely you are to support McCain. The hardcore Republicans, those who put immigration as an issue above the Iraq war? They're not likely to be thrilled with McCain's reach toward the center. Gerson might dismiss this with a, "Who else are they going to vote for?" That, however, is an attitude likely to lead to reduced voter turnout.

Gerson sees one, and only one, flaw in McCain. His attempt to reinvent himself as a supporter of Bush, leading to the infamous "hug" picture that is sure to feature prominently in Presidential campaign ads? Not a problem. His flip-flopping on the religious right, and attempt to mend fences with the likes of Pat Robertson? Not a problem. His legendary temper? Not a problem. His off-the-cuff comments, such as the idea of a 100+ year Iraq war? Gerson probably views them as an attribute.

No, to Gerson, McCain's one big problem is that he doesn't care about domestic issues.

McCain's foresight on Iraq has carried him far. But eventually he will need to engage Democrats on issues from health care to education to poverty. And being right on the war will not be enough.

Health care? Doesn't Gerson read his own paper? (Seriously, though, that was a weak analysis.) Can McCain argue persuasively on issues he doesn't care about? I don't recall that he has ever really tried, suggesting that he is either sticking to issues he cares about or is ultimately forgettable when he speaks about anything else.

Here's McCain filling up a couple of minutes with his views on education policy. Here he is promising to continue GW's economic policies.) When McCain is memorable, it's usually when he betrays his lack of understanding of the economy - that is, when he says things like "I wish interest rates were zero" and "I know a lot less about economics than I do about military and foreign policy issues. I still need to be educated."

And let's not forget, Gerson is assuming McCain is "right on the war". The majority of Americans want a strategy that gets us out of Iraq. McCain doesn't have one. The majority of Americans want a strategy that brings our troops home. McCain's willing to commit them to Iraq for 100 years or more. The military success of the surge doesn't overcome the reality that the public wants the war to end, nor does it substitute for political progress. As previously noted, by the President's own standards the surge is a total political failure.

For a better summary of the more probable dynamics being McCain's resurgence, see Daniel Larison's comments at Eunomia.

The Left Hand And the Right Hand

On the editorial page, the New York Times questions how helpful Iraq's new law, opening certain government jobs to Baath Party members, will be:

No one, it seems, has a clear sense of what the law will do. Some suggest it could actually exclude more former Baathists than it lets in — a sure-fire way to fuel political tensions rather than calm them.

Er... No one has a clear sense of what the law will do? Or is that nobody on the Editorial Page? Because if they ask their new Op-Ed hire, my guess is that he will tell them exactly what the law will do.

And now Iraq’s Parliament has passed a de-Baathification law — one of the so-called benchmarks Congress established for political reconciliation. For much of 2007, Democrats were able to deprecate the military progress and political reconciliation taking place on the ground by harping on the failure of the Iraqi government to pass the benchmark legislation. They are being deprived of even that talking point.

"And it's all good."

Lurching Along In The Ditch....

To build his case that "The Democrats were wrong in their assessments of the surge", William Kristol cherry-picks a strange statement from Barack Obama as a basis for attack:

When Obama was asked in the most recent Democratic presidential debate, “Would you have seen this kind of greater security in Iraq if we had followed your recommendations to pull the troops out last year?” he didn’t directly address the question. But he volunteered that “much of that violence has been reduced because there was an agreement with tribes in Anbar Province, Sunni tribes, who started to see, after the Democrats were elected in 2006, you know what? — the Americans may be leaving soon. And we are going to be left very vulnerable to the Shias. We should start negotiating now.”

But Sunni tribes in Anbar announced in September 2006 that they would join to fight Al Qaeda. That was two months before the Democrats won control of Congress.

Yes... And it was at least three months before "the surge" began, and nine months before the troop buildup was complete.

So is Kristol taking the position that Obama should be berated for failing to attribute to the surge something that preceded the surge? Or does he truly believe that everything positive that has ever happened in Iraq must be attributed to the surge, regardless of when it occurred? Nebuchadnezzar's Hanging Gardens of Babylon? Thank the surge!

In fairness to Kristol he does describe those non-surge accomplishments as having been "sustained" by the surge, not caused by it, but his sloppy logic more or less kicks the foundation out from under his entire attack.

Finding Success In Failure

Michael Gerson, the feeling man's Republican, shares a few gems:

But Gen. David Petraeus's counterinsurgency strategy has succeeded with disorienting speed. Its combination of vision and competence will fill chapters in military textbooks.

In spite of these gains, Democratic presidential candidates still insist on reckless timetables for withdrawal -- the surest way to rescue defeat from the jaws of victory. And Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid -- who declared that the surge had "failed" even before it was fully implemented -- now contends that "the surge hasn't accomplished its goals."

If Mr. Gerson would acquaint himself with the facts, even slightly, he would be aware that Harry Reid's statements are true. The surge has been a success militarily, but it has not accomplished its goals. To quote, you know, the President:

A successful strategy for Iraq goes beyond military operations. Ordinary Iraqi citizens must see that military operations are accompanied by visible improvements in their neighborhoods and communities. So America will hold the Iraqi government to the benchmarks it has announced.

To establish its authority, the Iraqi government plans to take responsibility for security in all of Iraq's provinces by November. To give every Iraqi citizen a stake in the country's economy, Iraq will pass legislation to share oil revenues among all Iraqis. To show that it is committed to delivering a better life, the Iraqi government will spend $10 billion of its own money on reconstruction and infrastructure projects that will create new jobs. To empower local leaders, Iraqis plan to hold provincial elections later this year. And to allow more Iraqis to re-enter their nation's political life, the government will reform de-Baathification laws, and establish a fair process for considering amendments to Iraq's constitution.

By what measure beyond the military - something the President told us up-front was an inadequate measure - is the Surge a success?

Ethnic cleansing preceded the surge (not as part of U.S. policy, but as a consequence of ethnic warring), and part of the surge plan has involved erecting huge concrete barriers between ethnic factions so as to minimize conflict. That has helped bring about a reduction in a reduction of ethnic violence and reduced casualties, both civilian and military. What lesson should we draw from other nations, as to what is likely to happen if the authoritative hand is removed and the ethnic groups are freed to renew their conflict? (The Yugoslav "ethnic civil war" model; The Chechnya/Slovakia "split the country" model... is there another?) Even with significant federal reconciliation, it will take a great deal of effort by the Iraqi government to keep ethnic tensions under control, and I have some doubt as to their ability to do it within the... indefinite future. So does John McCain - who is prepared to commit our forces to Iraq for a century or more.

Meanwhile, we are at the crossroads between "surge" and "escalation." Gerson is ready to engrave our military success in Iraq into the history books. Yet members of the military in Iraq see it as taking six years or longer to achieve our goals. And unfortunately, no matter what our military does, it contributes nothing to the willingness of Iraq's various factions to form some form of unity government. It may in some senses encourage certain groups to be intransigent, knowing that we remain present to keep a lid on things while they hold out for more. Meanwhile, we have a growing question of what it will take to hold our military together for that six years (or for McCain's century) while we wait for the promised political progress that never seems to come.

I think the question that Gerson should be addressing is whether the U.S. and Iraq will be better served by a Bush-style "Let's see what happens in the next (and the next, and the next) six months" approach, a McCain-style "Don't worry about progress, as we'll hold your hand for as long as it takes" approach, or a Democratic-style, "You had better shape up, or you're going to have to do this without us" approach. Which approach would he deem more "conservative", if not more "compassionate"?

Another Poorly Conceived Washington Post Editorial About Iraq....

When the Washington Post says this:

The common blind spot among the Democrats is Iraq. Eager to please a constituency that despises the war, the candidates commonly promise to "end" it, ignoring the reality that Iraq is still an active battlefield for al-Qaeda. Mr. Obama rails against the failure to destroy al-Qaeda's camps in eastern Pakistan, where no American troops operate, yet proposes to control al-Qaeda in Iraq with a "minimal over-the-horizon military force" - a plan that would duplicate the Pakistan problem. Ms. Clinton says that "we cannot succeed" against al-Qaeda "unless we design a strategy that treats the entire region as an interconnected whole, where crises overlap with one another and the danger of a chain reaction of disasters is real." Yet she would effectively exclude Iraq from that strategy.

What exactly do they mean?

When the Washington Post alludes to "the reality that Iraq is still an active battlefield for al-Qaeda", what do they mean?

• Is it that al-Qaeda will view a withdrawal from Iraq as evidence of American weakness, and thus (even though peripherally involved in the actual combat) withdrawal would hand them a victory? (If so, is it necessary to win every battle - whatever the cost - in order to win a war, even if the resources we allocate to that battle could be put to more effective uses in fighting that same war?)

• Is it (despite all evidence to the contrary) that they believe al-Qaeda is significantly invested in the war, and thus that victory would diminish its fighting force, munitions, and capacity?

• Is it that they believe that the Iraq war poses an existential threat to al-Qaeda, such that if we defeat the Iraq insurgency they will be wiped from the face of the planet? (And if so, what are they smoking?)

Is is something else entirely?

Is the statement, "...yet proposes to control al-Qaeda in Iraq with a 'minimal over-the-horizon military force'" meant to reference an actual fight based in Iraq against al-Qaeda, or the battle with the separate group which calls itself "al-Qaeda in Iraq"?

Al-Qaeda in Iraq is the United States' most formidable enemy in that country. But unlike Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda organization in Pakistan, U.S. intelligence officials and outside experts believe, the Iraqi branch poses little danger to the security of the U.S. homeland.

Not that I would want to quote the Post against itself.... Are they thus arguing that we have a moral duty to defeat "al-Qaeda in Iraq" to protect the Iraqis, despite their express belief that it poses little to no direct threat to the United States, even at the expense of targeting "Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda organization in Pakistan"?

Back in 2001-2002 we were told that it was part of bin Laden's plan to lure the United States into an economically crippling, unwinnable war in the Middle East. Most likely he had been reading the history of the Vietnam war, and anticipated a similar psychology among U.S. leadership - that we wouldn't want to show "weakness" by abandoning a fruitless war. But perhaps he was simply reading the Post. (I am not endorsing an immediate withdrawal - unlike the Post, I don't buy into the false dichotomy that our only choices are the status quo or complete withdrawal.)

If The Shoe Were On the Other Foot

In terms of prosecuting Blackwater 'contractors' for shooting civilians,

The legal path will not be easy, but there are options. The government could seek to prosecute the guards under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, or MEJA, which extends American criminal law to contractors overseas. Or it could try to court-martial the guards under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which was amended last year to cover contractors accompanying the armed forces in the field.

It could also offer a plea deal — including some prison time — to any guards found to have recklessly violated deadly force rules. The guards may be a lot more interested if Washington makes it clear that it is ready to waive the immunity from Iraqi prosecution, granted to contractors by the American occupation government three years ago.

None of these options is foolproof. MEJA applies to contractors that accompany American armed forces, while the Blackwater guards were working for the State Department. Using the military code would face the same problem and would have to contend with Supreme Court opinions from the 1950s and 1960s barring the courts-martial of civilians.

When you follow the law, especially if as the occupying power you made the law incredibly self-serving, things get so complicated. If the shoe were on the other foot, this would be easy - Bush would call them "illegal combatants", and argue that no further law or due process was required.

Why Does Robert Novak Hate America?

First he publicly discloses the name of a covert CIA operative, and now this?

Americans are not good at nation-building.

Any real American knows - we're good at everything.

Seriously, though, the issue isn't that we're "not good at nation building". The issue, which Novak is attempting to conceal behind a clould of smoke, is that the Bush Administration has been top-to-bottom incompetent in relation to every aspect of its Iraq war strategy. Had it wished to do so, it could have listened to the scholars and State Department experts who were warning it of the difficulty of nation building, and could have heeded their advice as to how it might be achieved (and also to their warnings as to the consequences of failure). But that would have meant revising their war plans, developing a much larger occupation force, giving up the rapid privatization and flat taxation plan they wished to impose on "liberated Iraq", and admitting to the American public that the war and occupation would be extremely costly and would involve a very long commitment.

Thanks to an incompetent Administration, editorially backed by Novak and his ilk, we got the extremely costly war and long commitment, with little else to show for it.

Cornering A Witness

How hard is it for Senators and Members of Congress, some of whom like to brag about their experiences as prosecutors, to corner a witness?

Is it reasonable to expect that we will be able to withdraw our troops from Iraq in less than 1,000 years?

If the answer is still, "I can't promise that they'll be home within that timeframe", you have a concession that no matter how successful the surge we're still potentially looking at endless war.

If you get a more likely, "Of course I expect them to be home within a millennium," you drop down to a century. If the answer is then, "I can't promise that they'll be home in less than 100 years", you have the follow-up question, "So it is your confident prediction that sometime in the next 100 to 1,000 years we can start bringing our troops home?"

If you get a commitment to a century, you drop to fifty years.... If you get a commitment to fifty years, you drop to twenty-five. At some point the person being questioned will have to stop saying, "I expect the troops to be home within that timeframe" and revert to, "I can't commit to that", and you have a range of years (be it "100 to 1,000", "50 to 100", "25 to 50", or something else) that is likely to get a lot of press attention....

McCain On "The Surge"

Today John McCain was arguing that the Democratic Party should be happy with the position of General Petraeus that "the surge" is working and that there will (possibly) be a "reduction" in troop levels to pre-surge levels in about a year. It's not such a bad talking point, but beyond that isn't very coherent.

• A "surge" has to end, or it is an "escalation". It was thus a foregone conclusion that if we were going to keep calling this a "surge" it would have an ending point.

• If "the surge" ends with no political progress, there is no reason to believe that further troop withdrawals are possible or even advisable if you wish to even maintain the status quo.

• The military successes of "the surge" do not automatically translate into political success. If "the surge" brings about none of the political reforms and improvements promised at its inception, the surge can be an unqualified military success yet still be a political failure. (Surely McCain has heard reference to armed conflicts were "we won every battle, yet lost the war".)

If General Petraeus is comfortable predicting an end to "the surge" by next July, why isn't he comfortable describing a timetable for additional troop reductions after that date?

I would venture that it is because he continues to expect that number of troops to remain in the field for at least another five to ten years.

Whatever "points" the Democratic Party can claim for getting tentative dates for the end of the surge, maintaining pre-surge troop levels for the indefinite future does nothing to bring this conflict to an end. McCain knows that, and if he wishes to vindicate himself as a "straight shooter" he should admit as much. (But perhaps "McCain the straight shooter" was always more of a matter of perception than reality.)

Slow To Acknowledge Reality

David Brooks describes that it has taken five years for (him and other) "policy makers" and self-described experts to grasp the obvious:

Most American experts and policy makers wasted the past few years assuming that change in Iraq would come from the center and spread outward. They squandered months arguing about the benchmarks that would supposedly induce the Baghdad politicians to make compromises. They quibbled over whether this or that prime minister was up to the job. They unrealistically imagined that peace would come through some grand Sunni-Shiite reconciliation.

Now, at long last, the smartest analysts and policy makers are starting to think like sociologists. They are finally acknowledging that the key Iraqi figures are not in the center but in the provinces and the tribes. Peace will come to the center last, not to the center first. Stability will come not through some grand reconciliation but through the agglomeration of order, tribe by tribe and street by street.

The tribal nature of Iraq is hardly a state secret. I and many others who don't even pretend to be experts have been discussing that appraoch from the outset.

The problem is not that it takes an "expert" or "policy maker" to recognize that it had greater potential to work than Bush's plan. The problem was that Bush pushed anybody who opposed his plan out of the room, and required that everybody else to provide cover for his notion of a quick invasion, reinvention of the nation, and departure, at minimum cost. Starting locally was always far more realistic than creating a national government, but that approach was inconsistent with the Bush Administrations fantasies of candy and flowers, as well as with the "product" it was trying to sell to the American consumer.

David, the actual experts have been out there all along. All you had to do was listen to them.

Hand Wringing Over "The Surge"

With all due respect to how well "the surge" has been played up in the media, what real difference does it make? If Bush gets another year of his war, and it turns out that "the surge" (like every other Bush White House claim about the war) has been exaggerated, what will the Republicans be claiming a year from now as they again try to save themselves from being held responsible for the lack of progress? "But we thought it was working last year" serves to excuse the Dems for any claimed optimism.

Beyond Bush and his immediate advisors, what's the gain to the Republican party in exaggerating the results of "the surge"? Bush has virtually no credibility and he cannot be reelected, so being again found to be prevaricating has essentially no impact on him - but he gets to carry on his war until he leaves office. But would you want to be a Republican Senator or Member of Congress in a competitive race, with that albatross hanging around your neck?

A Few Words On Iraq

I can't say much that hasn't been said elsewhere (and usually better), but let's take a moment to state the obvious:

• We're not going to get the Iraqis to do what we want. We are making a lot of demands that the Iraqis cannot reasonably be expected to fulfill, and other that the Iraqis largely do not want to fulfill. Their goals and interests are different from ours. Accept it. Get over it.

• We're not in Iraq for the long haul - we're going to be winding down the occupation, be it before or starting shortly after Bush leaves office. The monetary cost is too high, and the effect of maintaining present troop levels is too burdensome on the troops and the military. At this point it isn't clear that the geopolitical ramifications of withdrawing are worse than those of staying, and hope that with current levels of progress Iraq may be stable in another decade are not sufficient.

• We can't withdraw overnight - Even a "fast" withdrawal will be a long process, and I would not be surprised if the process took two or more years to complete.

• Defunding the war is not a realistic option - it would be a political catastrophe, would be shamelessly manipulated by the Bush White House to endanger the troops (who you should not expect to be withdrawn), and ignores the enormous cost of physically withdrawing that many troops and that much equipment from Iraq. I understand that many people thought that the Dems could magically end this war by cutting off funding, but the real world is more complicated than that.

• If you keep funding present troop levels, as the Bush White House apparently desires, this is an escalation, not a "surge". But if Bush is sufficiently Machiavellian to leave the troops in the field even without the necessary funding, the conundrum is the same for defunding the surge as it is for defunding the war as a whole. (What do you think Bush would do?)

As for Iran... I don't expect anything dramatic to unfold. If speculation that the Bush Administration intends to take military action against Iran turns out to be true, I expect it to be calculated to fall below what might precipitate a broader war or broader support for Shiite militias. That is to say, it would be ineffectual at achieving any of the Bush Administration's goals for Iran, which IMHO should make it an exceptionally foolish thing to do even in the eyes of a Bush Administration insider.