Giving Credit Where Credit Is Due....

And I think it is due. This is the type of case which can easily be deemed to "small" for a Supreme Court's attention, yet the Michigan Supreme Court stepped in and did the right thing. You may recall my earlier rant about this case:

Many years ago I worked with a highly ethical manufactured home community, such that I was never asked to interpret the boundaries of this statute. But if asked, I would have indicated that to me the immunity extended only to damage incidental to the execution of a court's order. That is, nobody in his right mind would confuse an order of eviction with a court's grant of permission to trash a tenant's property, but if something were accidentally dropped, dinged, dented or damaged during the eviction process the landlord would be safe from a lawsuit. With a manufactured home, that would include damage incidental to the removal of the home from its foundation and utilities hookups, and which might occur during transport due to the contents being unsecured.

Boy, would my advice have been excessively cautious. You see, as it turns out (albeit by the terms of an unpublished and therefore non-precedentially binding decision) the landlord and his agents would enjoy absolute immunity for any damage they caused to the tenant's property, even if resulting in the total loss or destruction of the property.

On Friday, the Michigan Supreme Court held,

On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the June 13, 2006 judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(G)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we REVERSE that part of the judgment of the Court of Appeals that found the defendants immune from suit under MCL 600.2918(3) because "plaintiffs' allegations unquestionably directly arose as a result of the eviction performed by Hometown America and its agent." Slip op, p 5. The plain language of MCL 600.2918(3) provides immunity only for actions undertaken pursuant to an order of eviction. Accepting the plaintiffs' well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and construing them in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, certain of the defendants' actions, including the conversion and destruction of plaintiffs' property in a manner that was neither necessary to effect the eviction nor incidental to the process of eviction, cannot be said as a matter of law to be within the scope of the July 7, 2004 order of eviction, and hence, may not have been undertaken pursuant to that order. Thus, the circuit court erred in granting summary disposition to the defendants under MCR 2.116(C)(7). We REMAND this case to the St. Clair Circuit Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this order. The application for leave to appeal as cross-appellant is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court.

I remain wary of the Supreme Court's tendency to reverse cases without hearing, and certainly don't always agree that justice results. But they got this one right.

It's Unbridled Activism May Not Get Much Attention....

... But the Michigan Supreme Court's continuing problems with civility are getting quite a bit of attention.

Attention Fans And Foes Of Fieger

Appellate Law and Practice has the latest on Geoff Fieger's continuing legal battle with the Michigan Supreme Court.

A Michigan "What If"?

What if a school bus driver got tired of the kids in her bus, pulled over on the inside shoulder of I-94 without turning on her overhead red flashing lights or extending her stop sign, told the kids to "get off and cross the road", then sat on the shoulder blocking oncoming traffic from seeing the children. The kids, intimidated by the many lanes of high speed traffic, wait for a while before one finally tries to cross. Would the school district or bus driver have any potential liability if that child was struck by a car - the driver of which could not see the child prior to impact because his line of sight was blocked by the school bus? According to the Michigan Supreme Court... absolutely not.

The school district would enjoy governmental immunity. Although there is a motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity, the exception would not apply because there was no direct physical contact between the bus and the vehicle that hit the child, nor was there direct contact between the child and the bus.

The bus driver would be deemed grossly negligent for such an act - that's obvious - and normally an act of gross negligence would prevent a claim of governmental immunity. But it wouldn't be "the one most immediate, efficient, and direct cause preceding" the child's injury. The child's "decision to cross the street at the moment when she did" would be "the immediate, efficient, and direct cause of her injury." Thus the school bus driver would also be immune from liability.

Note, the school bus driver in the actual case did not stop on the highway - she stopped at an intersection and, with her overhead lights off, told a child to get off the bus and cross the road. The dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals, after expressly reciting the rule that the facts in a summary disposition case are to be taken in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, observed that there was "testimony indicat[ing] that [the child] failed to immediately heed this instruction". This appears to reference testimony from a witness who was not even at the scene, and was applied to somehow free the court to ignore witness testimony that the child immediately crossed. The I-94 scenario is not an exaggeration - this decision would grant immunity given those facts.

Just ask the folks at "Overlawyered" where you are unlikely to read about this case - as long as the atrocity favors the defendant, atrocious outcomes in tort cases are fine. Right? (Helfer v Center Line Public Schools - Court of Appeals Decision; Supreme Court Reversal)