Those Darn Subsidies

Having been wrong, yet again, on the Middle East and his prediction that Hezbollah would be blamed for the damage to Lebanon once a ceasefire took hold, in War on Daddy's Dime, Thomas Friedman takes on subsidies:

I’m not sure yet who’s the winner in the war between Hezbollah and Israel, but I know who’s the big loser: Iran’s taxpayers. What a bunch of suckers.

Isn’t it obvious? As soon as the reckless war he started was over, Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, declared that Hezbollah would begin paying out cash to the thousands of Lebanese families whose homes were destroyed. “We will pay compensation, a certain amount of money for every family to rent for one year, plus buy furniture for those whose homes were totally destroyed,” said Nasrallah. “These number 15,000.”

I guess we'll leave aside for the moment the contradiction between Friedman's opening sentence, asserting that Iran's taxpayers are footing the bill, and his overall thesis, which is that Iran's rulers use state oil revenues to provide massive subsidies to keep their people reasonably content.

I understand why Mr. Friedman is upset. He predicted that Hezbollah would take a post-war P.R. hit and be blamed for the bombing damage, but here they are using Iran's oil wealth in a manner that may well further expand their popularity. It is also beyond obvious that high oil prices provide huge revenue streams to many undesirable regimes. But isn't this really an expression of his upset at having been blindsided by the obvious?

I have to admit that I am amused by statements like this:

To buy public support, Iran’s regime subsidizes housing, gasoline, interest rates, flour and rice.

What sort of nation, after all, would subsidize its oil industry? Offer subsidized housing or interest rates? Or subsidize agricultural products? Why, I even understand that there's a country which instituted subsidies on bee farming during WWII so that they would have sufficient beeswax to waterproof munitions for overseas shipment - and those subsidies remain in place, for no good reason, even today.... Where do you suppose that could be? (More here.) Perhaps Mr. Friedman should join forces with the Club for Growth.

Oh, I'm not arguing that U.S. subsidies are equal in scope, or have the same direct purpose as those in nations like Iran and Syria, but then what about Kuwait - are its subsidies okay, even though it remains a misogynistic dictatorial monarchy, because it isn't belligerent? Last I checked, its subsidies of its population made Iran's look small.

If we could cut the price of crude in half, it would mean that all of Iran’s oil income would go to subsidies — which would be unsustainable and therefore a huge threat to the regime.

Well, in theory.... But in practice, they made it through 2004 and early 2005, so even assuming an unlikely plunge in oil prices to a "mere" $35/bbl I think they would somehow keep up the bad fight.

Lebanon's Army To Control The Southern Border Region?

I may be a proverbial monkey hammering away at the keys, trying to produce Shakespeare, but apparently I actually anticipated what is now being proposed as a (partial) solution to the Israel-Lebanon war:

The Lebanese army called up 5,000 reservists last night to prepare for deployment along the border to try to speed up the departure of Israeli forces, the main hurdle to the United Nations security council adopting a ceasefire resolution.

The Lebanese army will only be deployed when Israel and Hizbullah agree to end hostilities.

The army, regarded as neutral by Israel, has not been involved in the present conflict. Its deployment would mark a significant change in the balance of power within the country: for more than 20 years southern Lebanon has been a virtual no-go area for the Lebanese army.

And so the poor Lebanese Army appears destined to go where any international military force would fear to tread....

The Air War vs. The Ground War

Jonathan Chait writes,

Let's face it, Israel's counter offensive in Lebanon doesn't seem to be going very well. Liberals are saying it. Conservatives are saying it. Plenty of Israelis are saying it. But here is the odd thing: nobody is paying very careful attention to the alternative. The criticism of Israel's ground campaign - however sound much of it may be - takes place against an assumption that peace could be at hand if only Israel stopped fighting.

A valid point, which sidesteps the real issue - the primary criticism has been of Israel's air campaign. It was (and is) so poorly designed and executed that you can only wonder if Israel intends to make Hezbollah the most popular and powerful force in Lebanon for the indefinite future.

Take a Krauthammer, Simmer off the Vitriol, Add a Dash of Chomsky....

And you have a recipe for a very unusual Krauthammer column, in that it's worth reading. As it turns out, when he stops telling us how much he hates everybody he perceives as an enemy of Israel and why we should share his sentiments, space appears in which sapience can emerge.

That dash of Chomsky.... One of Norm Chomsky's consistent points about U.S. Middle Eastern policy is that it is about what is in the perceived best interest of the United States, and to the extent that it is U.S. policy to support a strong Israel it is because fundamentally the U.S. views that as being in its best interest. Krauthammer seems to share that opinion:

Israel's war with Hezbollah is a war to secure its northern border, to defeat a terrorist militia bent on Israel's destruction, to restore Israeli deterrence in the age of the missile. But even more is at stake. Israel's leaders do not seem to understand how ruinous a military failure in Lebanon would be to its relationship with America, Israel's most vital lifeline. ... [In U.S. foreign policy] The question, as always, is: What have you done for me lately? There is fierce debate in the United States about whether, in the post-Sept. 11 world, Israel is a net asset or liability. Hezbollah's unprovoked attack on July 12 provided Israel the extraordinary opportunity to demonstrate its utility by making a major contribution to America's war on terrorism.

Like Chomsky, Krauthammer perceives that self-interest drives U.S. policy toward Israel. Like Chomsky, he overstates his case - I don't think you can look at the recent sense of Congress resolution, passing with a 410:8 vote, and not recognize that Israel's position is far from precarious. But I think they both sense what can happen, and what likely will happen, if in fact the consensus becomes that U.S. support for Israel is contrary to U.S. interests. Even if manifested only through the substitution of absentions for vetoes in U.N. Security Council votes pertaining to Israel.

I should note also that I agree with Krauthammer that Hezbollah is a threat to Israel and to the region, and that it would be a good thing if Hezbollah's military capacities were eliminated. I do differ from Krauthammer in that he apparently believes that Hezbollah could be defeated through a short-term ground war, but very much agree that Israel's air war represents an atrocious choice of tactics.

The United States has gone far out on a limb to allow Israel to win and for all this to happen. It has counted on Israel's ability to do the job. It has been disappointed. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has provided unsteady and uncertain leadership. Foolishly relying on air power alone, he denied his generals the ground offensive they wanted, only to reverse himself later. ...

His search for victory on the cheap has jeopardized not just the Lebanon operation but America's confidence in Israel as well.

I think Krauthammer recognizes but intentionally sidesteps the implications of his position. It certainly isn't the case that Israel cannot roll in the tanks and troops and have its ground war, even after its exceptionally destructive but tactically ineffectual air campaign. To the extent that a military victory can be won on the ground, nothing in the air campaign has limited Israel's opportunity for success, and arguably the destruction of Lebanese infrastructure would help Israel in a ground war. So the defeat Krauthammer perceives as being plucked from the jaws of victory would apparently be one of public perceptions and sentiment. It's not just a loss in the war by proxy against Iran ("The defeat of Hezbollah would be a huge loss for Iran, both psychologically and strategically.") It's that the tactics used have caused a lot of people in the West to question whether Israel holds the moral high ground, and have caused a significant backlash within Lebanon which could lead to a quick resurgence (temporary or long-term) of Hezbollah once the war ends.

A loss to Hezbollah may not mean much militarily for Israel or the West, but it means a lot psychologically. Hezbollah is already being perceived (yet again) on the Arab street as a heroic entity defeating a much more powerful adversary. It would exemplify the attitude we are (supposedly) working hard to change - that fundamentalist, militant Islam can bring pride and victory, even in the face of (decadent) Western imperialism. It of course doesn't help a bit that the Bush Administration eschews diplomacy, and thus rules out any resolution to this type of conflict which might illustrate a better way.

I may be more cynical than Krauthammer, who puts the blame for the poor choice of an air campaign on Israel's political leaders. I don't believe for a second that the U.S., in giving what Krauthammer desribes as "the green light -- indeed, the encouragement" to Israel to embark on this war, was not aware of Israel's intended tactics. Nobody said, "Hey - wait a second, that's not a good plan." Nobody stepped in when it became obvious that Israel intended to defeat Hezbollah primarily through air power and said, "We need to get them to bring in ground troops", or even "We should force a quick ceasefire to give Israel its 'victory' before it becomes obvious that this isn't working." Why? In my estimation, because the U.S. knew what Israel planned, and deemed it an appropriate manner in which to wage war against Hezbollah - perhaps even the preferred manner. After all, wouldn't a victory primarily through air power stand as vindication for Rumsfeld's vision of how wars should be fought?

[Updated to fix broken link.]

A Solution for Lebanon?

Oh, it's probably ultimately unworkable, but so is every other solution.

The context: Israel (and most of the rest of the world, apparently including most Arab states) wants to see Hezbollah disarmed. It could not achieve disarmament through eighteen years of occupation of southern Lebanon, and is now attempting to achieve disarmament through an air campaign which will, in all likelihood, destroy much of Hezbollah's arsenal while increasing Lebanese and Arab enmity toward Israel and sympathies with Hezbollah - like the occupation, a recipe for short-term gain and long-term pain. Israel has never wanted any significant international military force on its borders (and after the last time it was attempted not many foreign militaries have much interest in trying to act as peacekeepers). Israel distrusts the United Nations, and no UN force would be of sufficient size and strength to disarm Hezbollah.

So... How about trying something completely different? Bring in a UN force to monitor Lebanon's borders with Syria. Bring in a sufficient foreign miltary and police force to maintain order and stability in those areas of Lebanon north of the Litani River while the Lebanese military responds to Hezbollah. And make Lebanon and its military, supported by contributions of foreign training and military hardware, responsible for policing and controlling areas controlled by Hezbollah, including Lebanon's border with Israel. (Ideally, subject to practical limitations and security issues, the Arab states which oppose Hezbollah could be enticed to contribute manpower to any police force required as part of this effort, such that under most day-to-day circumstances the man on the street in Lebanon would encounter the face of an Arab policeman rather than a foreign soldier.) The people of Lebanon will see for themselves in Hezbollah is willing to kill Lebanese soldiers in order to maintain its military operations - something that should bring some sense of sobriety to the notion of Hezbollah as fighting for Lebanese independence and freedom from foreign occupation. And it keeps western forces off of the front lines.

If this plan were to work you should end up with a well-trained, well-disciplined Lebanese army which can ultimately maintain control of the entire nation, reducing the likelihood that Hezbollah will again be able to develop a significant militia. Perhaps a Lebanon that looks something like Jordan - but with an elected government instead of a monarchy.